Efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.04.003MaRDI QIDQ6584593zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Nabil Afodjo, Roland Pongou

Publication date 8 August 2024

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2024.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

anonymous two-sided economiesefficiencymaximalitypairwise stable matchingsstructural conditions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• Stable matching in large economies
• Unilateral stability in matching problems
• Valuing inputs under supply uncertainty: the Bayesian Shapley value
• Volume of trade and dynamic network formation in two-sided economies

Cited in

(1)

• Rationing to avoid conflict: a centralized assignment problem

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