Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive

DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2494MaRDI QIDQ1290837zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Louis Makowski, Joseph M. Ostroy, Uzi Segal

Publication date 3 June 1999

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/4ffdc43b99bcba3265fc45940e1cc24f180e1cec

zbMATH Keywords

general equilibriumincentive compatibleperfect competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cites work

• A Note on Incentives in Large Economies
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Economies with a Finite Set of Equilibria
• Fair allocations and equal incomes
• Fair allocations in large economies
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3547015 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
• On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
• On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
• Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and perfect competition
• Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in continuum economies. Characterization and existence

Cited in

(14)

• Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and perfect competition
• Perfect competition in the continuous assignment model
• Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments
• Competitive pricing and the core: with reference to matching
• Power at general equilibrium
• Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources
• No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods
• The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information
• STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3894786 (Why is no real title available?)
• Economic efficiency requires interaction
• Efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies
• Equilibrium and social norms
• Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility

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