Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive
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Publication:1290837
DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2494zbMATH Open0958.91038OpenAlexW2007251375MaRDI QIDQ1290837FDOQ1290837
Uzi Segal, Louis Makowski, Joseph M. Ostroy
Publication date: 3 June 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/4ffdc43b99bcba3265fc45940e1cc24f180e1cec
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Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
Cites Work
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- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- Economies with a Finite Set of Equilibria
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies
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- Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
- Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in continuum economies. Characterization and existence
- Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and perfect competition
- Fair allocations in large economies
- Fair allocations and equal incomes
- A Note on Incentives in Large Economies
Cited In (11)
- No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods
- Perfect competition in the continuous assignment model
- Economic efficiency requires interaction
- Power at general equilibrium
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Competitive pricing and the core: with reference to matching
- Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and perfect competition
- The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information
- Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility
- Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources
- STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS
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