Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive
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Publication:1290837
DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2494zbMath0958.91038OpenAlexW2007251375MaRDI QIDQ1290837
Uzi Segal, Louis Makowski, Joseph M. Ostroy
Publication date: 3 June 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/4ffdc43b99bcba3265fc45940e1cc24f180e1cec
General equilibrium theory (91B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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