No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0553-2MaRDI QIDQ2450141zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Uzi Segal, Joseph M. Ostroy

Publication date 16 May 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0553-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Public goods (91B18)

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Cites work

• A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
• Asymptotic efficiency of the demand revealing mechanism
• Asymptotic efficiency of the pivotal mechanism with general project space
• Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive
• Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
• Manipulation through bribes
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
• Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies
• Strategy-proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in continuum economies. Characterization and existence

Cited in

(5)

• Groves mechanisms and communication externalities
• Inducing Efficiency: Externalities, Missing Markets, and the Coase Theorem
• A solution to the problem of consumption externalities.
• Incentive mechanisms for international public goods under uncertainty of production costs
• Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility

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