No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0553-2zbMATH Open1287.91079OpenAlexW2170763724MaRDI QIDQ2450141FDOQ2450141

Authors: Uzi Segal, Joseph M. Ostroy 

Publication date: 16 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0553-2

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Manipulation through bribes
• On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies
• A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
• Asymptotic efficiency of the demand revealing mechanism
• Strategy-proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
• Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
• Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in continuum economies. Characterization and existence
• Asymptotic efficiency of the pivotal mechanism with general project space
• Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive

Cited In (4)

• Inducing Efficiency: Externalities, Missing Markets, and the Coase Theorem
• A solution to the problem of consumption externalities.
• Incentive mechanisms for international public goods under uncertainty of production costs
• Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility

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