A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00028MaRDI QIDQ4799864zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John O. Ledyard, Thomas R. Palfrey

Publication date 1999

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-164134782

zbMATH Keywords

taxationmarginal rates of substitution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

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Cited in

(21)

• Contract competition between hierarchies, managerial compensation and imperfectly correlated shocks
• Symmetric mechanism design
• No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods
• A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information
• Efficient Provision of a Discrete Public Good
• Public goods with congestion
• A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
• Efficient mechanisms for a partially public good.
• A characterization of optimal feasible tax mechanism
• Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives
• Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation
• Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game
• Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms
• Inequality-averse principal, exogenous budget, and second-best public-goods provision
• Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers
• Efficient voting with penalties
• Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences
• Auctioning a discrete public good under incomplete information
• On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
• A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems
• Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability

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