Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
- On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation
- On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
- Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent preferences and feasible sets
- Bayesian Implementation
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
Cites work
- A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods
- A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
- Bayesian Implementation
- Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
- Incentive-efficient equilibria of two-party sealed-bid bargaining games
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Optimal Auction Design
- Private information in large economies
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms
Cited in
(3)
This page was built for publication: Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2173392)
