Two-agent interactive implementation

DOI10.1007/S10058-021-00247-6MaRDI QIDQ2070744zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shuichi Tsugawa

Publication date 24 January 2022

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00247-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Interactive implementation
• The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
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• Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation

Cites work

• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• Bayesian Implementation
• Interactive implementation
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Perfect Bayesian implementation when the planner is a player
• Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation
• The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
• Voluntary implementation when the planner is a player

Cited in

(3)

• Interactive implementation
• A solution to the two-person implementation problem
• Voluntary implementation when the planner is a player

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