Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation

DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0355-3zbMATH Open1167.91340OpenAlexW1995308557MaRDI QIDQ2272189FDOQ2272189

Authors: Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato 

Publication date: 6 August 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0355-3

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation

Cited In (8)

• Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies
• Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
• Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment
• A solution to the two-person implementation problem
• Two-agent interactive implementation
• Selecting winners with partially honest jurors
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals

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