Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems
In the case of implementation in Nash equilibria or of implementation in undominated Nash equilibria mechanisms have been proposed. However, for the mechanisms proposed for Nash equilibria, the set of undominated Nash equilibrium outcomes may be strictly smaller than the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes. In such a case, there is no guarantee that a mechanism designed for Nash implementation of a given social choice correspondence will implement it if the agents do not use weakly dominated strategies. In this paper, the author considers the design of mechanisms for which both the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes and the set of undominated Nash equilibrium outcomes coincide with the set of outcomes that are optimal according to a given social choice correspondence. He provides a characterization of correspondences implementable in Nash equilibria for at least three agents. In the two-agent case, another characterization is proposed.
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3709875 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation in perfect equilibria
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
- Undominated Nash implementation with collusion and renegotiation
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments
- Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
- A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents
- Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria
- Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction
- Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation
- Double implementation without no-veto-power
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
- Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms
- Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching
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