Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3709875 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Implementation in perfect equilibria
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
Cited in
(9)- Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation
- Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms
- Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria
- Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction
- Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
- A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents
- Double implementation without no-veto-power
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments
- Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching
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