Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments
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Recommendations
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria
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Cites work
- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
Cited in
(6)- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
- Double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria with private values
- Double implementation by a simple game form in the commons problem
- Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems
- A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents
- Double implementation without no-veto-power
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