Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria
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Publication:2362193
DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0915-2zbMath1392.91056OpenAlexW2135385181MaRDI QIDQ2362193
Vikram Manjunath, Eun Jeong Heo
Publication date: 6 July 2017
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0915-2
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Cites Work
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