An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
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Publication:5932220
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00057-8zbMath0978.91019MaRDI QIDQ5932220
Publication date: 1 February 2002
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
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