Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
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Publication:1363085
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)82720-6zbMATH Open0876.90013MaRDI QIDQ1363085FDOQ1363085
Authors: Sang-Chul Suh 
Publication date: 1 December 1997
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
Cited In (11)
- A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
- Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
- Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
- Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
- Games of manipulation in marriage problems
- Behavioral strong implementation
- Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
- An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
- Robust coalitional implementation
- Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria
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