A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2013.04.013MaRDI QIDQ405557zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ville Korpela

Publication date 5 September 2014

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.013

zbMATH Keywords

implementationmatching rulestrong equilibriumsufficient condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3709875 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementation of college admission rules
• Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash implementation of matching rules
• Nash implementation theory - a note on full characterizations
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• On cores and indivisibility
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus
• Sub-core solutions of the problem of strong implementation

Cited in

(17)

• A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
• Sub-core solutions of the problem of strong implementation
• A new necessary condition for Nash implementation
• The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
• New necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation
• Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
• An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
• Monotonicity, implementation and generalized strategy-proofness
• Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability
• Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
• Robust coalitional implementation
• Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
• Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• Behavioral strong implementation
• Strong Nash implementation and economic applications
• A strategic aspect of the strong positive association condition

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