Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
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Publication:2046171
DOI10.1007/s11238-020-09790-0zbMath1470.91103OpenAlexW3119781662MaRDI QIDQ2046171
Publication date: 17 August 2021
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09790-0
Cites Work
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- A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
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- Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
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- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- Aggregation of binary evaluations with abstentions
- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
- Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction
- Time and Nash implementation
- Abstention as an escape from arrow's theorem
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Implementation and Renegotiation
- Toward Natural Implementation
- Fault Tolerant Implementation
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- Voluntary implementation
- Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms
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