A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
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Publication:1089233
DOI10.1007/BF00433954zbMath0618.90007MaRDI QIDQ1089233
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
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