Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:1017791)
Recommendations
- A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
- Selecting winners with partially honest jurors
- Picking the winners
- A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
- Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury
Cites work
- A Bayesian model of voting in juries
- A model of expertise
- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- Divide-and-permute
- Eliciting information from multiple experts
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- The scholarship assignment problem
Cited in
(15)- Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition
- Implementation theory
- Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction
- Collectively ranking candidates via bidding in procedurally fair ways
- Selecting winners with partially honest jurors
- Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
- Picking the winners
- A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
- A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
- Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
- Judgement and ranking: living with hidden bias
- Implementation with a sympathizer
- Evaluation and strategic manipulation
- Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury
- Nash implementation of supermajority rules
This page was built for publication: Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1017791)
