Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
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Publication:1017791
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.08.005zbMATH Open1159.91329OpenAlexW2004115884MaRDI QIDQ1017791FDOQ1017791
Authors: Pablo Amorós 
Publication date: 12 May 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.centrodeestudiosandaluces.info/PDFS/E200610.pdf
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Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
- Eliciting information from multiple experts
- A model of expertise
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- The scholarship assignment problem
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- A Bayesian model of voting in juries
- Divide-and-permute
Cited In (15)
- Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition
- Implementation theory
- Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction
- Collectively ranking candidates via bidding in procedurally fair ways
- Selecting winners with partially honest jurors
- Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
- Picking the winners
- A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
- A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
- Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
- Judgement and ranking: living with hidden bias
- Implementation with a sympathizer
- Evaluation and strategic manipulation
- Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury
- Nash implementation of supermajority rules
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