Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction
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Publication:6080655
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.06.001zbMath1522.91072OpenAlexW4382395871MaRDI QIDQ6080655
Publication date: 4 October 2023
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.06.001
Cites Work
- Selecting winners with partially honest jurors
- Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
- A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
- A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
- The scholarship assignment problem
- Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
- Implementation via backward induction
- Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
- Handbook of game theory with economic applications. Vol. 3
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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