A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.11.038zbMath1210.91030OpenAlexW1984982463MaRDI QIDQ531410

Pablo Amorós

Publication date: 29 April 2011

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://theeconomics.uma.es/malagawpseries/Papers/METCwp2010-7.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriummechanism designcontest

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (7)

Selecting winners with partially honest jurors ⋮ Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms ⋮ Picking the winners ⋮ Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents ⋮ Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction ⋮ A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites ⋮ Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury

Cites Work

• The scholarship assignment problem
• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules

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