A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
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Publication:531410
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.038zbMath1210.91030MaRDI QIDQ531410
Publication date: 29 April 2011
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://theeconomics.uma.es/malagawpseries/Papers/METCwp2010-7.pdf
Related Items
Selecting winners with partially honest jurors, Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms, Picking the winners, A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
Cites Work
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- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules