A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
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Cites work
- Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- The scholarship assignment problem
- The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
Cited in
(10)- Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
- Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
- Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury
- Selecting winners with partially honest jurors
- Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
- Picking the winners
- A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
- Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction
- Eliciting the deserving winner in the presence of enemies
- Aggregating incomplete rankings
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