The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
DOI10.1137/S0036144503435945zbMATH Open1104.91020OpenAlexW3121899235MaRDI QIDQ4652256FDOQ4652256
Authors: Roberto Serrano 
Publication date: 25 February 2005
Published in: SIAM Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/s0036144503435945
Recommendations
- A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
- On combining implementable social choice rules
- Weakly implementable social choice rules
- Social Choice Theory
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3976693
- The reach of social choice theory
- Social choice: Theory and research
- Social choice rules implemented in dominant strategies
- Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 193519
game theorymonotonicityNash equilibriumcomplete and incomplete informationdominancemechanism designdecentralizationimplementation theory
Social choice (91B14) Applications of game theory (91A80) Fundamental topics (basic mathematics, methodology; applicable to economics in general) (91B02) Mathematics for nonmathematicians (engineering, social sciences, etc.) (00A06)
Cited In (43)
- Social Choice Theory
- Social choice mechanism under complete information
- Symmetric mechanism design
- Constrained implementation
- Implementation theory
- Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- A method for eliciting utilities and its application to collective choice
- Privacy in implementation
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Maxmin implementation
- Implementation of voting operators
- Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Quantum Bayesian implementation
- Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Behavioral strong implementation
- Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
- Picking the winners
- An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo
- Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate
- Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
- A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
- Complexity and repeated implementation
- Computational implementation
- Social laws in alternating time: effectiveness, feasibility, and synthesis
- Time and Nash implementation
- Whose opinion counts? Implementation by sortition
- Fully endogenous mechanism selection on finite outcome sets
- Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
- Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
- Implementation with a sympathizer
- Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury
- A crash course in implementation theory
- Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
- A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions
- Quantum mechanism helps agents combat ``bad social choice rules
- Double implementation of voting operators
- Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences
- Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
This page was built for publication: The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4652256)
