Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments
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Publication:5111104
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_7zbMATH Open1443.91132OpenAlexW2947561579MaRDI QIDQ5111104FDOQ5111104
Authors: Leonid Hurwicz, Andrew Postlewaite, Eric Maskin 
Publication date: 26 May 2020
Published in: Studies in Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_7
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Cites Work
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
- Manipulation via Endowments
- Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
- A feasible Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in the two-agent economy
- Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments
Cited In (8)
- Implementation theory
- Implementation via rights structures
- Distributions of the budget sets: an axiomatic analysis
- Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The endowment game when \(n = 2\)
- Fully endogenous mechanism selection on finite outcome sets
- Implementation with unknown endowments in a two-trader pure exchange economy
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