Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_7MaRDI QIDQ5111104zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Leonid Hurwicz, Andrew Postlewaite, Eric Maskin

Publication date 26 May 2020

Published in Studies in Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_7

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumsocial choice rulesoutcome functionstrategy domain

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

• The endowment game when \(n = 2\)
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• A feasible Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in the two-agent economy
• Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments
• Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
• Manipulation via Endowments
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation

Cited in

(8)

• Implementation theory
• Implementation via rights structures
• Distributions of the budget sets: an axiomatic analysis
• Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795159 (Why is no real title available?)
• The endowment game when \(n = 2\)
• Fully endogenous mechanism selection on finite outcome sets
• Implementation with unknown endowments in a two-trader pure exchange economy

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