Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments (Q5111104)
From MaRDI portal
 | This is the item page for this Wikibase entity, intended for internal use and editing purposes. Please use this page instead for the normal view: Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7204218
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| default for all languages | No label defined |
||
| English | Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7204218 |
Statements
Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments (English)
0 references
26 May 2020
0 references
social choice rules
0 references
Nash equilibrium
0 references
outcome function
0 references
strategy domain
0 references
0 references
0 references
0.8347207903862
0 references
0.8070549368858337
0 references
0.7998796701431274
0 references
0.7968239784240723
0 references
0.7911981344223022
0 references
