Nash implementation with a private good (Q1865168)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1887530
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| English | Nash implementation with a private good |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1887530 |
Statements
Nash implementation with a private good (English)
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25 March 2003
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The author constructs a mechanism for the implementation of constrained Lindahl outcomes in the presence of a private transferable good and shows that an outcome is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it is constrained Lindahl. Next, the author considers the implementation of a class of social choice rules based on price, again establishing a Nash equilibrium criterion. Finally, the author generalizes arbitrary social planning problems subject to the conditions of montonicity and the existence of a private good.
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Nash implementation
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Lindahl equilibrium
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Walrasian equilibrium
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simple mechanisms
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monotonicity
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private good
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0.8783873319625854
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0.8597307801246643
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0.8530659675598145
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0.8515800833702087
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0.8440537452697754
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