A feasible Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in the two-agent economy

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(90)90172-WzbMATH Open0715.90032OpenAlexW2035357293MaRDI QIDQ751973FDOQ751973

Shinsuke Nakamura

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90172-w

zbMATH Keywords

Walrasian equilibriumtwo- agent economyweakly balanced and continuous mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites Work

• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Smooth versus discontinuous mechanisms
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (3)

• Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence by market games
• Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies
• Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments

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