Nash implementation with a private good

DOI10.1007/S00199-002-0262-2MaRDI QIDQ1865168zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John Duggan

Publication date 25 March 2003

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/1802/2124

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityWalrasian equilibriumNash implementationLindahl equilibriumsimple mechanismsprivate good

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Nash implementation of Lindahl allocations
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Nash implementation in pure public good economies
• On Nash-implementation in the presence of withholding
• Nash implementation in production economies

Cited in

(14)

• Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
• Constrained implementation
• Implementation in partial equilibrium
• Nash implementation in pure public good economies
• Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations
• Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer
• Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies when Preferences are Single-Dipped with Best Indifferent Allocations
• Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments
• Implementation of Lindahl equilibrium: An integration of the static and dynamic approaches
• Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
• Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
• Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
• Nash implementation of the Lindahl performance in economies with just two consumers: an impossibility result
• Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale

This page was built for publication: Nash implementation with a private good

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1865168)