Nash implementation with a private good
From MaRDI portal
The author constructs a mechanism for the implementation of constrained Lindahl outcomes in the presence of a private transferable good and shows that an outcome is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it is constrained Lindahl. Next, the author considers the implementation of a class of social choice rules based on price, again establishing a Nash equilibrium criterion. Finally, the author generalizes arbitrary social planning problems subject to the conditions of montonicity and the existence of a private good.
Recommendations
Cited in
(16)- Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer
- Natural implementation in public goods economies
- Implementation of Lindahl equilibrium: An integration of the static and dynamic approaches
- Nash implementation of Lindahl allocations
- Nash implementation in pure public good economies
- Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale
- Constrained implementation
- Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
- Implementation in partial equilibrium
- Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
- Nash implementation of the Lindahl performance in economies with just two consumers: an impossibility result
- Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments
- Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies when Preferences are Single-Dipped with Best Indifferent Allocations
- Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations
This page was built for publication: Nash implementation with a private good
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1865168)
