Implementation in partial equilibrium

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.01.008MaRDI QIDQ2397627zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Takashi Hayashi, Michele Lombardi

Publication date 23 May 2017

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/135110/7/135110.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

complementarityimplementationincome effectpartial equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• A crash course in implementation theory
• A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
• A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
• Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• Incentives in Teams
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• On cores and indivisibility
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
• Small Income Effects: A Marshallian Theory of Consumer Surplus and Downward Sloping Demand
• Smallness of a commodity and partial equilibrium analysis
• Voting by Committees

Cited in

(2)

• Constrained implementation
• One-step-ahead implementation

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