A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
In this paper the authors deal with the informational efficiency issue pertaining to \textit{E. Maskin}'s theorem [Rev. Econ. Stud. 66, No. 1, 23--38 (1999; Zbl 0956.91034)]. They focus on \(s\)-mechanisms in which each agent reports to the planner solely her own preference and her neighbor's preference, in addition to a feasible social outcome and an integer. It is shown that the class of SCCs (social choice correspondences) that are implementable by \(s\)-mechanisms is fully identified by Condition \(\mu\) of \textit{J. Moore} and \textit{R. Repullo} [Econometrica 58, No. 5, 1083--1099 (1990; Zbl 0731.90009)]. The authors achieve their result in two ways. Firstly, they show their result by directly employing the classical Condition \(\mu\). Next, in the framework developed by Moore and Repullo, they introduce a new condition, Condition \(M^{s}\), which is shown to be equivalent to Condition \(\mu\). The results of the paper are built on the implicit assumption that agents participating in a mechanism are perfectly rational.
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