A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3215724 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- Ambiguity aversion and trade
- Are the treasures of game theory ambiguous?
- Attitudes toward uncertainty and randomization: an experimental study
- Bayesian Implementation
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- Event-separability in the Ellsberg urn
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- Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms
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- Liquidity and asset prices in rational expectations equilibrium with ambiguous information
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
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- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards
- Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
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- Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
- Rational preferences under ambiguity
- Risk, ambiguity, and state-preference theory
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Strategic games beyond expected utility
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Toward Natural Implementation
Cited in
(14)- Constrained implementation
- Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization
- Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
- Implementation in partial equilibrium
- Two-player rationalizable implementation
- One-step-ahead implementation
- Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Implementation of welfare maximizing networks
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
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