On Bayesian Implementable Allocations

DOI10.2307/2297511zbMATH Open0611.90020OpenAlexW2286842536MaRDI QIDQ3751320FDOQ3751320

Authors: Thomas R. Palfrey, Sanjay Srivastava 

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170912-132538243

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zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationNash equilibriarational expectations equilibriumsocial choice correspondenceLindahl allocationsBayesian implementable

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cited In (39)

• Credible implementation
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
• Implementation theory
• On fairness of equilibria in economies with differential information
• Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
• Bayesian implementation: The necessity of infinite mechanisms
• Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
• Self-fulfilling mechanisms in Bayesian games
• Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies
• Switching from complete to incomplete information
• Divide-and-permute
• Communication and bargaining in the spatial model
• Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies
• Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria
• Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
• Fully-revealing equilibria of multiple-sender signaling and screening models
• Stopping agents from ``cheating
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games
• Sequential rationality, implementation and pre-play communication
• Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information
• Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation
• Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
• Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
• Implementation via backward induction
• A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
• Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies
• A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
• Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
• Weak implementation
• Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies
• Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
• Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
• The evolution of monetary equilibrium
• Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent preferences and feasible sets
• The core of an economy with differential information
• Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
• Implementation in differential information economies

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