Recommendations
- Bayesian incentive compatibility via fractional assignments
- Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent preferences and feasible sets
- Bayesian Mechanism Design
- Bayesian incentive compatible parametrization of mechanisms
- Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
- Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
- Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments
- Bayesian Implementation
- A Bayesian Approach to the Best-Choice Problem
Cited in
(41)- Implementation in differential information economies
- Stopping agents from ``cheating
- Implementation via backward induction
- Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information
- Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets
- Self-fulfilling mechanisms in Bayesian games
- Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games
- Interactive implementation
- The core of an economy with differential information
- Bayesian implementation: The necessity of infinite mechanisms
- Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies
- Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
- A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
- Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
- Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
- Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation
- The evolution of monetary equilibrium
- Weak implementation
- Sequential rationality, implementation and pre-play communication
- Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent preferences and feasible sets
- Divide-and-permute
- Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies
- Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
- Fully-revealing equilibria of multiple-sender signaling and screening models
- Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria
- Switching from complete to incomplete information
- A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- On fairness of equilibria in economies with differential information
- Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
- Implementation theory
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2204545 (Why is no real title available?)
- Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies
- Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
- Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
- Credible implementation
- Communication and bargaining in the spatial model
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