Credible implementation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.09.001MaRDI QIDQ863264zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bhaskar Chakravorty, Luis Corchón, Simon Wilkie

Publication date 26 January 2007

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.001

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentimplementationcredibilityrenegotiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Toward Natural Implementation
• Robust dynamic implementation
• Mechanism Design by Creditability
• Implementation in differential information economies

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4143814 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4091137 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
• A new approach to the implementation problem
• Efficiency and Mechanisms with no Regret
• Egalitarianism and incentives
• Feasible and Continuous Implementation
• Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
• Interactive implementation
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
• On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
• Sequential rationality, implementation and pre-play communication
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
• The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
• Voluntary implementation

Cited in

(15)

• Mechanism Design by Creditability
• The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
• Fault Tolerant Implementation
• Implementation theory
• Undominated Nash implementation with collusion and renegotiation
• Self-rejecting mechanisms
• Interactive implementation
• Perfect implementation
• Secure implementation in allotment economies
• Voluntary implementation
• Credible auctions: a trilemma
• Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3941259 (Why is no real title available?)
• Sequential commitment games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2038846 (Why is no real title available?)

This page was built for publication: Credible implementation

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q863264)