Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3823374
DOI10.2307/1912575zbMath0669.90017OpenAlexW1965763922MaRDI QIDQ3823374
Sanjay Srivastava, Thomas R. Palfrey
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912575
incomplete informationBayesian Nash equilibriumallocation ruleincentive compatible mechanismsfull implementationBayesian monotonicitypure exchange economic
Related Items (43)
Coalition-proof full efficient implementation ⋮ Sequential rationality, implementation and pre-play communication ⋮ Perfect Bayesian implementation ⋮ Incentive compatibility under ambiguity ⋮ Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria ⋮ Allocation of resources in a divisionalized firm ⋮ Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types ⋮ Stopping agents from ``cheating ⋮ Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation ⋮ A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction ⋮ On the implementation of the median ⋮ Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation ⋮ Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies ⋮ Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments ⋮ The evolution of monetary equilibrium ⋮ Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Quantum Bayesian implementation ⋮ Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments ⋮ Ex post implementation ⋮ Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication ⋮ Implementation via backward induction ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information ⋮ Ambiguous implementation: the partition model ⋮ Implementation under ambiguity ⋮ A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems ⋮ The revelation approach to Nash implementation ⋮ Bayesian implementation with verifiable information ⋮ Rationalizable implementation ⋮ Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems ⋮ A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation ⋮ Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals ⋮ Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets ⋮ Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments ⋮ Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games ⋮ Interactive implementation ⋮ Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection ⋮ Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners ⋮ Contingent commodities and implementation ⋮ Informational smallness in rational expectations equilibria.
This page was built for publication: Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
