Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.03.007zbMATH Open1318.91034OpenAlexW2130310416MaRDI QIDQ2347780FDOQ2347780

Authors: Makoto Shimoji, Paul Schweinzer 

Publication date: 8 June 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.york.ac.uk/media/economics/documents/discussionpapers/2012/1221.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

implementationincomplete informationrationalizabilityincentive compatibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• On rationalizability in extensive games
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• Interactive epistemology and solution concepts for games with asymmetric information
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions.
• Exact implementation
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Implementation with evidence
• Rationalizable implementation
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Bayesian Implementation
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
• Robust implementation in general mechanisms
• Implementation with partial provability
• The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
• Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
• Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions.
• On rationalizability and beliefs in discrete private-value first-price auctions
• Transparent restrictions on beliefs and forward-induction reasoning in games with asymmetric information

Cited In (4)

• The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
• Transparent restrictions on beliefs and forward-induction reasoning in games with asymmetric information
• Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
• Implementation with a sympathizer

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