Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2347780
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.007zbMath1318.91034OpenAlexW2130310416MaRDI QIDQ2347780
Paul Schweinzer, Makoto Shimoji
Publication date: 8 June 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.york.ac.uk/media/economics/documents/discussionpapers/2012/1221.pdf
Related Items (2)
Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information
Cites Work
- Implementation with partial provability
- Rationalizable implementation
- Robust implementation in general mechanisms
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
- Exact implementation
- On rationalizability in extensive games
- The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
- Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions.
- Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions.
- Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
- Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
- Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information
- On Rationalizability and Beliefs in Discrete Private-Value First-Price Auctions
- Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
- Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
- Bayesian Implementation
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Implementation with evidence
- Robust Mechanism Design
This page was built for publication: Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
