Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
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Publication:1125572
DOI10.1006/JETH.1999.2555zbMATH Open0972.91020OpenAlexW2167649812MaRDI QIDQ1125572FDOQ1125572
Authors: Pierpaolo Battigalli, Marciano Siniscalchi 
Publication date: 6 December 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/674
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- Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk
- Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
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