Psychological Nash equilibria under ambiguity

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2022.09.005zbMATH Open1505.91024OpenAlexW3194172745MaRDI QIDQ2108770FDOQ2108770

Authors Giuseppe De Marco, Maria Romaniello, Alba Roviello 

Publication date 20 December 2022

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.09.005

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium existencepsychological gamesequilibrium selectionambiguous beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory for games (91A30) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

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Cites Work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 51788 (Why is no real title available?)
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2235418 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3186512 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• Hierarchies of beliefs for compact possibility models
• Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty: Breaking down backward induction
• Non-additive beliefs and strategic equilibria
• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Set-valued analysis
• Variational preferences and equilibria in games under ambiguous belief correspondences

Cited In (6)

• Ambiguous games without a state space and full rationality
• Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments -- evidence from a natural field experiment
• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• Equilibrium refinement in psychological games
• Games in context: equilibrium under ambiguity for belief functions
• COMMENTS ON ZELENÝ'S PAPER CONCERNING COGNITIVE EQUILIBRIA

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