Psychological Nash equilibria under ambiguity

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2022.09.005zbMATH Open1505.91024OpenAlexW3194172745MaRDI QIDQ2108770FDOQ2108770

Authors: Giuseppe De Marco, Maria Romaniello, Alba Roviello 

Publication date: 20 December 2022

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.09.005

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zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium existencepsychological gamesequilibrium selectionambiguous beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory for games (91A30) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites Work

• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Set-valued analysis
• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Dynamic psychological games
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• Hierarchies of beliefs for compact possibility models
• Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty: Breaking down backward induction
• Non-additive beliefs and strategic equilibria
• Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs
• Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Convergences of marginal functions with dependent constraints
• A limit theorem for equilibria under ambiguous belief correspondences
• Variational preferences and equilibria in games under ambiguous belief correspondences
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Cited In (6)

• Ambiguous games without a state space and full rationality
• Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments -- evidence from a natural field experiment
• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• Equilibrium refinement in psychological games
• Games in context: equilibrium under ambiguity for belief functions
• COMMENTS ON ZELENÝ'S PAPER CONCERNING COGNITIVE EQUILIBRIA

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