Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments -- evidence from a natural field experiment

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.01.006zbMATH Open1458.91016OpenAlexW3123727622MaRDI QIDQ1995486FDOQ1995486

Mark Kassis, Sascha L. Schmidt, Dominik Schreyer, Matthias Sutter

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.crema-research.ch/papers/2020-17.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

behavioral economicspsychological pressuredynamic tournamentpenalty shoot-outssports professionalsvalue of decision rights

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Equilibrium play in matches: binary Markov games
• Large Stakes and Big Mistakes

Cited In (1)

• Fairer Shootouts in Soccer: The ( m, n ) Rule

   Recommendations

• Incentive effects and overcrowding in tournaments: An experimental analysis 👍 👎
• Behavior in strategic settings: evidence from a million rock-paper-scissors games 👍 👎
• Contests with group size uncertainty: experimental evidence 👍 👎
• Sabotage in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Contestants: Empirical Evidence from the Soccer Pitch 👍 👎
• Decision-making in competitive framings -- strategic behavior of chess players in mini-ultimatum game chess puzzles 👍 👎
• Single- and double-elimination tournaments under psychological momentum 👍 👎
• Tournament-induced risk-shifting: a mean field games approach 👍 👎
• When higher prizes lead to lower efforts -- the impact of favoritism in tournaments 👍 👎
• Psychological Nash equilibria under ambiguity 👍 👎

This page was built for publication: Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments -- evidence from a natural field experiment

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1995486)