Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments -- evidence from a natural field experiment

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.01.006zbMATH Open1458.91016OpenAlexW3123727622MaRDI QIDQ1995486FDOQ1995486

Mark Kassis, Sascha L. Schmidt, Dominik Schreyer, Matthias Sutter

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.crema-research.ch/papers/2020-17.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

behavioral economicspsychological pressuredynamic tournamentpenalty shoot-outssports professionalsvalue of decision rights

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• Equilibrium play in matches: binary Markov games
• Large Stakes and Big Mistakes

Cited In (1)

• Fairer Shootouts in Soccer: The ( m, n ) Rule

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