Equilibrium play in matches: binary Markov games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.04.011zbMath1214.91009OpenAlexW2161736093MaRDI QIDQ632969

John Wooders, Rabah Amir, Mark Walker

Publication date: 28 March 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.04.011

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumstochastic gamesstrictly competitive gamesminimax strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Applications of game theory (91A80) Games in extensive form (91A18) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

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Cites Work

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• The bad match; a total reward stochastic game
• Two-player stochastic games. I: A reduction
• Two-player stochastic games. II: The case of recursive games
• On the Existence of Easy Initial States for Undiscounted Stochastic Games
• Recursive Repeated Games with Absorbing States
• The Big Match
• Stochastic Games
• Stochastic games
• On the irrelevance of risk attitudes in repeated two-outcome games

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