Best-of-two contests with psychological effects

DOI10.1007/S11238-012-9313-8MaRDI QIDQ365802zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alex Krumer

Publication date 9 September 2013

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9313-8

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay contestsbest-of-two contestswinner-take-all contests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Measurement and performance in psychology (91E45)

Recommendations

• Resource allocations in the best-of-\(k\) (\(k=2, 3\)) contests
• Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players
• Two-stage contests with effort-dependent values of winning
• First-mover advantage in best-of series: an experimental comparison of role-assignment rules
• Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments -- evidence from a natural field experiment

Cites work

• Best-of-three all-pay auctions
• Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
• Multi-battle contests
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Understanding perpetual R\&D races

Cited in

(9)

• Let's meet as usual: do games played on non-frequent days differ? Evidence from top European soccer leagues
• Strategic manipulations in round-robin tournaments
• Keep on fighting: the dynamics of head starts in all-pay auctions
• Single- and double-elimination tournaments under psychological momentum
• On the optimal allocation of prizes in best-of-three all-pay auctions
• Competitive balance when winning breeds winners
• Resource allocations in the best-of-\(k\) (\(k=2, 3\)) contests
• Gaining advantage by winning contests
• Tournament schedules and incentives in a double round‐robin tournament with four teams

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