Transparent restrictions on beliefs and forward-induction reasoning in games with asymmetric information
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Cites work
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Cited in
(11)- Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings
- On non-monotonic strategic reasoning
- Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
- Interactive epistemology and solution concepts for games with asymmetric information
- Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings
- Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
- Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games
- Order independence for rationalizability
- The epistemic spirit of divinity
- Level-k thinking in the extensive form
- Monotonicity and robust implementation under forward-induction reasoning
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