Transparent restrictions on beliefs and forward-induction reasoning in games with asymmetric information
DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2012-0005zbMATH Open1278.91021OpenAlexW2007142017MaRDI QIDQ2867522FDOQ2867522
Authors: Andrea Prestipino, Pierpaolo Battigalli 
Publication date: 19 December 2013
Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:igi:igierp:376
Recommendations
Noncooperative games (91A10) Dynamic games (91A25) Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Cites Work
- On rationalizability in extensive games
- A course in game theory.
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Admissibility in Games
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
- Interactive epistemology and solution concepts for games with asymmetric information
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- On a new axiomatic theory of probability
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
- When do type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs?
- Strategic rationality orderings and the best rationalization principle
- Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
- Forward induction reasoning revisited
- Robust mechanism design. The role of private information and higher order beliefs. With a foreword by Eric Maskin
- A Note on Rationalizability and Restrictions on Beliefs
- Self-admissible sets
- RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
- Self-enforcing Agreements and Forward Induction Reasoning
- Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies
Cited In (9)
- Order independence for rationalizability
- Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games
- Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
- On non-monotonic strategic reasoning
- Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
- Interactive epistemology and solution concepts for games with asymmetric information
- The epistemic spirit of divinity
- Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings
- Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings
This page was built for publication: Transparent restrictions on beliefs and forward-induction reasoning in games with asymmetric information
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2867522)
