Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105733zbMath1530.91089MaRDI QIDQ6090458

Fan Wu, Xundong Yin, Xi Weng

Publication date: 17 November 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

signalinglinear strategyRiley equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites Work

• Incentive compatibility and differentiability: new results and classic applications
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Competitive signalling
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• D1 signaling equilibria with multiple signals and a continuum of types
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
• Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
• Informational Equilibrium
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Consumer Scores and Price Discrimination
• RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
• Economics of leadership and hierarchy

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