Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games
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Publication:6090458
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105733zbMath1530.91089MaRDI QIDQ6090458
Publication date: 17 November 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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