Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105733MaRDI QIDQ6090458zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Xi Weng, Fan Wu, Xundong Yin

Publication date 17 November 2023

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JET.2023.105733

zbMATH Keywords

linear strategyRiley equilibriasignaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Equilibrium refinements (91A11) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games
• Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
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• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games

Cites work

• A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Competitive signalling
• Consumer scores and price discrimination
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• D1 signaling equilibria with multiple signals and a continuum of types
• Economics of leadership and hierarchy
• Incentive compatibility and differentiability: new results and classic applications
• Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
• Informational Equilibrium
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Strategic communication with lying costs
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• Transparent restrictions on beliefs and forward-induction reasoning in games with asymmetric information

Cited in

(1)

• Quadratic Multi-Dimensional Signaling Games and Affine Equilibria

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