Incentive compatibility and differentiability: new results and classic applications
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Publication:405529
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2013.07.004zbMATH Open1296.91055OpenAlexW2147911310MaRDI QIDQ405529FDOQ405529
Authors: George J. Mailath, Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden 
Publication date: 5 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/working-papers/10-032.pdf
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Cites Work
- Sequential Equilibria
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
- Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
- Fully revealing outcomes in signalling models: An example of nonexistence when the type space is unbounded
- A Liquidity-based Model of Security Design
- Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection?
Cited In (8)
- Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments
- Pervasive signaling
- Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games
- Unobservable costly effort in security design
- Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games
- Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
- A note on the incentive compatible core
- Targeted information release in social networks
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