Unobservable costly effort in security design

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111573MaRDI QIDQ6154282zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matthew J. Robertson

Publication date 19 March 2024

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111573

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionsignallingsecurity designsecuritisationcostly effort

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Derivative securities (option pricing, hedging, etc.) (91G20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Security design without verifiable retention
• Adverse Selection and Security Design
• Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions
• A Liquidity-based Model of Security Design
• Good signals gone bad: dynamic signalling with switched effort levels

Cites work

• A Liquidity-based Model of Security Design
• Incentive compatibility and differentiability: new results and classic applications
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Securitization and optimal retention under moral hazard
• Strategic Liquidity Supply and Security Design
• Strict monotonicity in comparative statics

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