Adverse Selection and Security Design
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Publication:4894852
DOI10.2307/2297853zbMATH Open0856.90017OpenAlexW2099052153MaRDI QIDQ4894852FDOQ4894852
Authors: Rohit Rahi 
Publication date: 7 October 1996
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/20820
Recommendations
- Adverse selection, moral hazard and propitious selection
- Adverse selection and liquidity distortion
- Efficiency and adverse selection
- Adverse selection and bilateral asymmetric information
- Adverse selection, efficiency and the structure of information
- Adverse selection under ignorance
- Adverse Selection and Convertible Bonds
- Optimal securities under adverse selection and moral hazard
- Adverse selection, segmented markets, and the role of monetary policy
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1066450
Cited In (10)
- Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection
- Unobservable costly effort in security design
- Optimality of debt under flexible information acquisition
- Security design without verifiable retention
- Security Design, Insider Monitoring, and Financial Market Equilibrium
- A model of collateral, investment, and adverse selection
- Adverse Selection and Convertible Bonds
- Strategic Liquidity Supply and Security Design
- Security design in non-exclusive markets with asymmetric information
- Information acquisition, price informativeness, and welfare
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