Adverse Selection and Security Design

DOI10.2307/2297853MaRDI QIDQ4894852zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rohit Rahi

Publication date 7 October 1996

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10230/20820

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionoptimal security designprivately informed entrepreneur

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

• Adverse selection, moral hazard and propitious selection
• Adverse selection and liquidity distortion
• Efficiency and adverse selection
• Adverse selection and bilateral asymmetric information
• Adverse selection, efficiency and the structure of information
• Adverse selection under ignorance
• Adverse Selection and Convertible Bonds
• Optimal securities under adverse selection and moral hazard
• Adverse selection, segmented markets, and the role of monetary policy
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1066450

Cited in

(10)

• Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection
• Unobservable costly effort in security design
• Optimality of debt under flexible information acquisition
• Security design without verifiable retention
• Security Design, Insider Monitoring, and Financial Market Equilibrium
• A model of collateral, investment, and adverse selection
• Adverse Selection and Convertible Bonds
• Strategic Liquidity Supply and Security Design
• Security design in non-exclusive markets with asymmetric information
• Information acquisition, price informativeness, and welfare

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