Incentive compatibility with interdependent preferences
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Publication:4583376
DOI10.1111/J.1742-7363.2011.00176.XzbMATH Open1416.91249OpenAlexW1840386690MaRDI QIDQ4583376FDOQ4583376
Authors: Marialaura Pesce, Nicholas C. Yannelis
Publication date: 28 August 2018
Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00176.x
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- Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
- Incentive compatibility and differentiability: new results and classic applications
- Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments
- Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
- Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types
- Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability
- Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility
- Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
- Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability
- A note on the incentive compatible core
- Incentive Compatibility on the Blockchain
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