Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
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Publication:2078029
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Cites work
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Cited in
(5)- Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
- Green closed-loop supply chain optimization strategy considering CER and incentive-compatibility theory under uncertainty
- Domains admitting ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanisms: a characterization for the two-alternative case
- The limits of ex post implementation without transfers
- Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
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