Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.10.008zbMATH Open1483.91055OpenAlexW3214430762MaRDI QIDQ2078029FDOQ2078029
Authors: Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno, Salvador Barberà 
Publication date: 25 February 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/1024_0.pdf
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mechanismsstrategy-proofnessPareto efficiencypreference functionsallocation problemsex post incentive compatibilityjury decisionsinterdependent types
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Cited In (5)
- The limits of ex post implementation without transfers
- Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
- Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
- Domains admitting ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanisms: a characterization for the two-alternative case
- Green closed-loop supply chain optimization strategy considering CER and incentive-compatibility theory under uncertainty
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