Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2013.06.020zbMath1284.91184OpenAlexW2037220323MaRDI QIDQ2446468

Nenad Kos, Matthias Messner

Publication date: 17 April 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.06.020

zbMATH Keywords

implementationmechanism designincentive compatibilitynon-quasilinear environments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions ⋮ Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles

Cites Work

• Optimal allocation without transfer payments
• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• On the implementability of contracts without quasilinear utility
• Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
• Extremal incentive compatible transfers
• Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Monotonicity and Implementability
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets

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