Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
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Publication:1622360
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.005zbMath1417.91229OpenAlexW2807601023WikidataQ129739174 ScholiaQ129739174MaRDI QIDQ1622360
Nenad Kos, Humberto Moreira, Vinicius Carrasco, Vitor Farinha Luz, Matthias Messner, Paulo Klinger Monteiro
Publication date: 19 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.005
robustnessindividual rationalityambiguity aversionoptimal mechanism designmoment conditionsincentive compatibility
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