Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
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Publication:1622360
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.05.005zbMATH Open1417.91229OpenAlexW2807601023WikidataQ129739174 ScholiaQ129739174MaRDI QIDQ1622360FDOQ1622360
Authors: Vinicius Carrasco, Vitor Farinha Luz, Nenad Kos, Matthias Messner, Humberto Moreira, Paulo Monteiro 
Publication date: 19 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.005
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moment conditionsrobustnessambiguity aversionincentive compatibilityindividual rationalityoptimal mechanism design
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Cited In (27)
- Robust multidimensional pricing: separation without regret
- Optimal selling scheme for heterogeneous consumers with uncertain valuations
- On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design
- Information design in optimal auctions
- Persuasion with ambiguous receiver preferences
- Optimal sale across venues and auctions with a buy-now option
- Correlation-robust auction design
- The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
- Efficient demands in a multi-product monopoly
- Optimal sales limits in multi-stage bargain sales with shifts of customers
- Robust mechanism design and production structure for assembly systems with asymmetric cost information
- Separation in distributionally robust monopolist problem
- Target-oriented regret minimization for satisficing monopolists
- Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents
- Bayesian auctions with efficient queries
- Optimal sales to users who hold inventory
- Worst‐case equilibria in first‐price auctions
- Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
- Optimal revenue-sharing mechanisms with seller commitment to ex-post effort
- Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- Price discrimination with robust beliefs
- Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions
- Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions
- Rationally Inattentive Seller: Sales and Discrete Pricing
- Optimal pricing for selling to a static multi-period newsvendor
- Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO
- Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition
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