Robust contracting under common value uncertainty

DOI10.3982/TE2385zbMath1396.91225OpenAlexW2647970619MaRDI QIDQ4682726

Sarah Auster

Publication date: 19 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2385

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguityoptimal contractinglemons problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions ⋮ Robust contracting in general contract spaces ⋮ Robust contracting with additive noise ⋮ Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions ⋮ Robust incentives for risk ⋮ Recursive non-expected utility: connecting ambiguity attitudes to risk preferences and the level of ambiguity