Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions
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Publication:2682007
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105555OpenAlexW3047112648MaRDI QIDQ2682007FDOQ2682007
Publication date: 31 January 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2008.01618
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Cites Work
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Cited In (4)
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