Abstract types and distributions in independent private value auctions

DOI10.1007/S00199-008-0386-0MaRDI QIDQ2391061zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paulo Monteiro

Publication date 24 July 2009

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10438/762

zbMATH Keywords

abstract typesindependent private valuesrevenue equivalence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions
• Computationally convenient distributional assumptions for common-value auctions
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• An efficient ascending auction for private valuations
• Common-value auctions with discrete private information
• A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: verifiable types
• Mechanism design for arbitrary type spaces
• Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations

Cites work

• A generalization of a problem of Steinhaus
• Mechanism design for arbitrary type spaces

Cited in

(2)

• Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
• Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values

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