Persuasion with ambiguous receiver preferences
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Publication:6579448
DOI10.1007/S00199-023-01522-ZzbMATH Open1545.91097MaRDI QIDQ6579448FDOQ6579448
Authors: Eitan Sapiro-Gheiler 
Publication date: 25 July 2024
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Ambiguity Aversion, Robustness, and the Variational Representation of Preferences
- The all-pay auction with complete information
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- Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics
- Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions
- Allocation games with caps: from Captain Lotto to all-pay auctions
- Competitive Optimality of Logarithmic Investment
- Minimax Theorems
- Uniqueness of optimal strategies in Captain Lotto games
- All-pay auctions with ties
- Mechanism design with maxmin agents: theory and an application to bilateral trade
- Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
- Ambiguous persuasion
- Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
- Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
- Robust mechanisms: the curvature case
- Persuasion with unknown beliefs
- Extreme points and majorization: economic applications
- Preparing for the worst but hoping for the best: robust (Bayesian) persuasion
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