Persuasion with ambiguous receiver preferences

DOI10.1007/S00199-023-01522-ZMaRDI QIDQ6579448zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Eitan Sapiro-Gheiler

Publication date 25 July 2024

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00199-023-01522-Z

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasionmaxmin utilitymean-preserving contraction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Individual preferences (91B08)

Recommendations

• Persuasion under ambiguity
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• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors

Cites work

• All-pay auctions with ties
• Allocation games with caps: from Captain Lotto to all-pay auctions
• Ambiguity Aversion, Robustness, and the Variational Representation of Preferences
• Ambiguous persuasion
• Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics
• Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
• Competitive Optimality of Logarithmic Investment
• Discrete Colonel Blotto and general lotto games
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Extreme points and majorization: economic applications
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Mechanism design with maxmin agents: theory and an application to bilateral trade
• Minimax Theorems
• Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
• Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Persuasion with unknown beliefs
• Preparing for the worst but hoping for the best: robust (Bayesian) persuasion
• Robust mechanisms: the curvature case
• Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions
• Uniqueness of optimal strategies in Captain Lotto games

Cited in

(1)

• Persuasion without priors

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