Persuasion with ambiguous receiver preferences
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6579448
Recommendations
Cites work
- All-pay auctions with ties
- Allocation games with caps: from Captain Lotto to all-pay auctions
- Ambiguity Aversion, Robustness, and the Variational Representation of Preferences
- Ambiguous persuasion
- Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics
- Competitive Optimality of Logarithmic Investment
- Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
- Discrete Colonel Blotto and general lotto games
- Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
- Extreme points and majorization: economic applications
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Mechanism design with maxmin agents: theory and an application to bilateral trade
- Minimax Theorems
- Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
- Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
- Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- Persuasion with unknown beliefs
- Preparing for the worst but hoping for the best: robust (Bayesian) persuasion
- Robust mechanisms: the curvature case
- Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- The all-pay auction with complete information
- Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions
- Uniqueness of optimal strategies in Captain Lotto games
This page was built for publication: Persuasion with ambiguous receiver preferences
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6579448)
