Optimal trading mechanisms for an informed seller

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00154-XMaRDI QIDQ1927367zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Rolf Tisljar

Publication date 1 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designinformed principal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• Selling with evidence
• A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information
• Optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders
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• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226088 (Why is no real title available?)
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values

Cited in

(3)

• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
• Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
• Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers

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