Optimal trading mechanisms for an informed seller

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00154-XzbMATH Open1254.91256MaRDI QIDQ1927367FDOQ1927367

Authors: Rolf Tisljar 

Publication date: 1 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designinformed principal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (3)

• Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers
• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
• Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions

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