Selling with evidence
DOI10.3982/TE2885zbMATH Open1422.91311OpenAlexW2618705568MaRDI QIDQ5225078FDOQ5225078
Authors: Frédéric Koessler, Vasiliki Skreta 
Publication date: 19 July 2019
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2885
Recommendations
mechanism designconsumer heterogeneityproduct information disclosurecertificationinterdependent valuationsinformed principal
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
Cites Work
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Cited In (9)
- How to sell hard information
- Pre-sale information
- Informed seller with taste heterogeneity
- Selling less information for more: garbling with benefits
- Mechanism design by an informed principal: private values with transferable utility
- Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
- Buyer-optimal extensionproof information
- Auction and the informed seller problem
- Optimal trading mechanisms for an informed seller
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