Selling with evidence

DOI10.3982/TE2885MaRDI QIDQ5225078zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Frédéric Koessler, Vasiliki Skreta

Publication date 19 July 2019

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te2885

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designconsumer heterogeneityproduct information disclosurecertificationinterdependent valuationsinformed principal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
• Informed seller with taste heterogeneity
• Auction and the informed seller problem
• Mechanism design by an informed principal: private values with transferable utility
• Selling Procedures with Private Information and Common Values

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3307201 (Why is no real title available?)
• A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information
• An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
• Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
• Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
• Disclosures and Asset Returns
• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• Implicit Functions and Solution Mappings
• Informed seller with taste heterogeneity
• Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability
• Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
• Lower semicontinuity of the feasible set mapping of linear systems relative to their domains
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Mechanism design by an informed principal: private values with transferable utility
• Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
• Optimal Auction Design
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
• Strategic Information Revelation
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Two-person bargaining with verifiable information

Cited in

(9)

• How to sell hard information
• Pre-sale information
• Informed seller with taste heterogeneity
• Selling less information for more: garbling with benefits
• Mechanism design by an informed principal: private values with transferable utility
• Buyer-optimal extensionproof information
• Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
• Auction and the informed seller problem
• Optimal trading mechanisms for an informed seller

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